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Gildenblatt: Seize the Day

SEIZE THE DAY: RENEWED HOPE FOR THE PERMISSIBILITY
OF IN REM COUNTERCLAIMS AGAINST THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AFTER THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S
SUBSTITUTED OPINION IN $4,480,466.16?
Evan Gildenblatt

I. INTRODUCTION
In rem jurisdiction is an enduring legal fiction that continues to divide
legal scholars and policymakers to this very day. Put simply, in rem
actions are “against a thing and not a person.” 1 The concept of in rem
jurisdiction supports the power of a court to exercise jurisdiction over and
pass judgment upon a piece of property itself (rather than an individual),
because the property may be deemed guilty in the eyes of the law. Rather
conveniently for courts, in rem jurisdiction can be exercised when the
owner of a piece of property is unknown to authorities, or when the owner
is known, but is outside the personal jurisdiction of the court in question.2
Even in situations in which a property owner is both known to authorities
and within the personal jurisdiction of the court, the federal government
has increasingly chosen to initiate in rem civil forfeiture proceedings due
to the lower burden of proof and reduction in procedural hurdles.3
Because the property itself is the defendant, court cases are often
captioned as such in full reporter citations,4 resulting in bizarre names
such as United States v. Ninety-Five Barrels, More or Less, Alleged Apple
Cider Vinegar;5 United States v. Approximately 64,695 Pounds of Shark
Fins;6 or United States v. An Article of Hazardous Substance Consisting
of 50,000 Cardboard Boxes More or Less, Each Containing One Pair of
Clacker Balls, Labeled in Part: (Box) “* * * Kbonger * * * It’s Fun Test
Your Skill It Bounces It Flips Count the Hits * * * Specialty Mfg. Co.,
Seattle, Wash. * * *”.7
To make matters more complicated, the naming conventions of the

1. In Rem, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010).
2. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 69 (2015) (“The in rem proceeding affects specific property within
the jurisdiction of the court and does not adjudicate any personal claim or personal liability, meaning
personal service is unnecessary for a court to obtain personal jurisdiction in such a proceeding.”).
3. See discussion, infra Part II.A.
4. For illustrative purposes, in rem cases in this Note will initially be referred to by their complete,
unabridged captions. Courts and modern scholarly publications typically shorten in rem captions
whenever possible, and some jurisdictions have done away entirely with using adversarial captions for
new in rem proceedings.
5. 265 U.S. 438 (1924).
6. 520 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008).
7. 413 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
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United States Supreme Court call for petitioners to be listed first, leaving
readers with such cases as One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania 8 or
A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v.
Attorney General of Massachusetts,9 in which it may appear on first
glance that an inanimate object came to life and initiated legal action. 10
In November 2019, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a
seemingly unremarkable substituted opinion in United States v.
$4,480,466.16 in Funds Seized from Bank of America Account Ending in
2653.11 The court’s holding from its original August 2019 opinion
remained unchanged; a husband and wife whose property had been seized
by the federal government were barred under sovereign immunity from
asserting counterclaims in the civil forfeiture proceedings against their
property.12 However, the court’s substituted opinion addressed a specific
question that it had initially declined to consider: whether counterclaims
against the government are a procedural mechanism available to
claimants of property that is the defendant in a civil asset forfeiture case. 13
Civil asset forfeiture as a law enforcement practice has been the subject
of renewed public concern—and indeed, outrage—over the course of the
last decade.14 The Supreme Court has itself addressed perceived
governmental abuses of the mechanism, even going so far as to rule that
punitive or partly-punitive civil forfeiture runs afoul of the Eighth
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. 15 The Court, though, has not

8. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
9. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
10. Additionally, while federal and state governments alike still frequently utilize in rem
jurisdiction, a governmental entity need not be part of proceedings. Private parties commonly file in rem
actions in salvage cases or maritime shipping claims in order to gain title or effectively secure collateral
for any potential judgment. See, e.g., R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. The Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, Its
Engines, Tackle, Apparel, Appurtenances, Cargo, etc., Location Within One (1) Nautical Mile of a Point
Located at 41 43’32” North Latitude and 49 56’49” West Longitude, Believed to be the RMS Titanic, 435
F.3d 521 (4th Cir. 2006); Steel Coils Inc., v. M/V Lake Marion, Her Engines, Boilers, etc., 331 F.3d 422
(5th Cir. 2003).
11. 942 F.3d 655 (5th Cir. 2019) [hereinafter $4,480,466.16], cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 112 (2020).
12. United States v. $4,480,466.16 in Funds Seized from Bank of Am. Account Ending in 2653,
936 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 2019).
13. $4,480,466.16, 942 F.3d at 659-63.
14. See, e.g., Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Civil Asset Forfeiture (Home Box Office
broadcast Oct. 5, 2014); Michael Sallah, et al., Stop and Seize: Aggressive Police Take Hundreds of Millions
of Dollars from Motorists not Charged with Crimes, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/06/stop-and-seize/; Sarah Stillman, Taken,
NEW YORKER (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/12/taken.
15. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993); see also Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682
(2019). In Timbs, the Court extended Austin to the states by incorporating the Excessive Fines Clause;
until that time, it was one of few provisions remaining in the Bill of Rights that had yet to be subject to
incorporation. The scope of this Note is limited to a specific procedural question in the context of federal
civil asset forfeiture, but Timbs and the resulting body of literature nevertheless provide considerable
insight into both the larger public debate and the overall position of civil asset forfeiture in the eyes of the
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specifically addressed the question of whether counterclaims against the
government are permissible in in rem civil forfeiture actions. In 1991, the
First Circuit Court of Appeals found such counterclaims to be
unconditionally barred,16 and the issue has arisen infrequently since then.
Albeit niche in the larger context of civil forfeiture abuses, the resolution
of this question could have an outsized influence over federal law
enforcement practices.
This Note examines the circuit split created by $4,480,466.16 and
addresses whether counterclaims against the federal government are
permissible in in rem civil forfeiture actions. Part II of this Note discusses
the relevant history of both in rem jurisdiction and civil forfeiture, and
provides a historical illustration through which civil forfeiture’s
endurance in the United States can be better understood. Part II also seeks
to explain the reemergence of civil forfeiture and subsequent efforts to
restrict its use. Finally, Part II concludes by examining the circuit court
opinions representing the two major poles in the debate over in rem
counterclaims.
Part III of this Note argues that although the First Circuit’s plain
language interpretation regarding the permissibility of in rem
counterclaims may be comparatively more intuitive, it remains less
compelling than the Fifth Circuit’s historical and contextual analysis.
Additionally, Part III examines whether the nature of modern civil
forfeiture necessitates an approach that departs from those of both the
First Circuit and the Fifth Circuit. This Note concludes in Part IV by
assessing the current legal landscape and reasserting the need for clear,
workable standards to govern the federal civil forfeiture regime.
II. BACKGROUND
In rem jurisdiction came into modern recognizable form under the
English medieval law of deodand (from the Latin deo dandum: “given to
god”), but its roots can be traced to legal concepts established by the
ancient Israelites.17 Prevailing wisdom once held that when an object (or
domesticated animal) proximately caused the death of a human being, the
object was guilty of the underlying offense and should be forfeited to the
Crown so that the departed soul could find peace. 18 The doctrine of in rem
jurisdiction slowly developed under English law to differentiate, albeit

Court.
16. See United States v. One Lot of U.S. Currency ($68,000), etc., 927 F.2d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 1991)
[hereinafter $68,000].
17. LEONARD W. LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY 7 (1996).
18. Id. at 10–13; ANTHONY GRAY, PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN PERIL: A COMPARATIVE
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 157 (2017).
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informally, between three general forms of “guilty” property: (1) “things
guilty,” or those used to violate the law; (2) “things hostile,” or those
belonging to an enemy; and (3) “things indebted,” or those substituted to
fulfill the obligation of a debtor.19 And despite the fact that deodands have
never formally existed within the bounds of American jurisprudence, it is
also clear that “their underlying principles have endured to the present,
constituting the foundations of the law of civil forfeiture in the United
States.”20
A. Federal Civil Asset Forfeiture
At its core, modern asset forfeiture is “the taking of property by the
government without compensation because of the property’s connection
to criminal activity.”21 While not all in rem actions are civil asset
forfeiture actions, civil asset forfeiture actions are almost exclusively in
rem.22 Notably, there exist three general categories of forfeiture under
federal law: (1) criminal forfeiture; (2) civil forfeiture; and (3)
administrative forfeiture.23
Criminal forfeiture accompanies an in personam criminal proceeding
against a defendant, and the government may only seize the property in
question if a defendant is convicted of the underlying offense.24 Civil
forfeiture, on the other hand, is typically undertaken through an in rem
proceeding against the property itself.25 A civil forfeiture proceeding need
not accompany any type of criminal action, nor is the government
required to establish a property owner’s guilt. Rather, “it is enough that
19. Compare RUFUS WAPLES, A TREATY ON PROCEEDINGS IN REM 2 (1882) with Calero-Toledo
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680–82 (1974) (The United States Supreme Court’s analysis
organized historical forfeitures into three loosely corresponding categories: (1) deodand; (2) “[f]orfeiture
. . . at common law from conviction for felonies or treason”; and (3) “statutory forfeitures of offending
objects used in violation of the customs and revenue laws.”).
20. LEVY, supra note 17, at 19.
21. United States Department of Justice, Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section, Civil
Asset Forfeiture: Purposes, Protections, and Prosecutors, 67 DEP’T JUST. J. FED. L. & PRAC. 3, 6 (2019);
accord DEE R. EDGEWORTH, ASSET FORFEITURE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 1 (2d ed. 2008) (“Asset forfeiture has been described as the divestiture without compensation of
property used in a manner contrary to the laws of the sovereign.”).
22. See EDGEWORTH, supra note 21, at 24. But see id. at 21 n.1 (“18 U.S.C. § 545 permits the
forfeiture of smuggled goods, ‘or the value thereof’ without a criminal conviction. Therefore, the
forfeiture of the smuggled merchandise would be civil in rem, but an action personally against the party
to recover the value of the merchandise would be civil in personam.”) (internal citations omitted).
23. STEFAN D. CASSELLA, ASSET FORFEITURE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (2d ed. 2013). This
Note’s use of the term “civil forfeiture” encompasses both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms.
24. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 97-139, CRIME AND FORFEITURE 5 (2015).
25. See EDGEWORTH, supra note 21, at 8 (Federal law enforcement agents may take advantage of
civil forfeiture statutes to “immediately seize and retain possession of the property pending the resolution
of proceedings,” and are even permitted by some statutes to conduct warrantless seizures “based on
probable cause.”).
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the property was involved in a crime to which forfeiture attaches in the
manner in which statute demands,” and the property owner must then
rebut a presumption of guilt.26 Of particular significance is the fact that in
order to succeed, civil forfeiture actions require a lower burden of proof
than criminal proceedings.27
Administrative forfeiture is a non-judicial mechanism by which law
enforcement agencies are granted specific statutory authority to seize
property during the course of an investigation. 28 If no ownership claim is
filed during a mandated notice period, the agency enters a “declaration of
forfeiture,” and the matter is effectively concluded. 29 Although
administrative forfeiture is also a civil matter, scholars and practitioners
often separate it into a distinct category in recognition of its “non-judicial”
nature and the additional statutory restrictions on its use.30
Due to the fact that forfeiture laws are far from a monolith, “[t]here is
neither a common law of forfeiture nor a single provision authorizing
forfeiture in all cases,” and “[t]he process has almost no rhyme or
reason.”31 There exist hundreds of federal forfeiture statutes, ranging from
those that cover violations of the Northern Pacific Halibut Act of 1982,32
to those that cover violations of the Trading with the Enemy Act of
1917.33 Owing to the maritime origins of asset forfeiture, there are of
course dozens of statutes governing violations at sea, including those
aimed at “[p]reventing transportation of goods to aid insurrection,” 34 or

26. Id. at 6; accord Craig Gaumer, A Prosecutor’s Secret Weapon: Federal Civil Forfeiture Law,
55 U.S. ATTORNEY’S BULL. 21, 71 (2007) (“[Civil forfeiture] has less stringent standards for obtaining a
seizure warrant. To obtain a criminal forfeiture-related seizure warrant, a prosecutor must establish
probable cause to believe that the property to be seized would, in the event of conviction, be subject to
forfeiture.” In a civil forfeiture proceeding, however, “the government may seize personal property, even
prior to filing the complaint, through a seizure warrant obtained simply upon showing probable cause to
believe that the property to be seized is subject to forfeiture.”).
27. EDGEWORTH, supra note 21, at 20. Additionally, the government is permitted to rely on
hearsay evidence in establishing probably cause. Id.
28. CASSELLA, supra note 23, at 11; Types of Federal Forfeiture, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/afp/types-federal-forfeiture (last updated Feb. 28, 2020) (“Property that can be
administratively forfeited is: merchandise the importation of which is prohibited; a conveyance used to
import, transport, or store a controlled substance; a monetary instrument; or other property [not including
liquid assets] that does not exceed $500,000 in value.”).
29. See DOYLE, supra note 24, at 6 (administrative forfeitures make up a majority of federal civil
forfeitures and “are, in oversimplified terms, uncontested civil forfeitures”); see also S. Poverty L. Ctr.,
Civil Asset Forfeiture: Unfair, Undemocratic, and Un-American (Oct. 30, 2017),
https://www.splcenter.org/20171030/civil-asset-forfeiture-unfair-undemocratic-and-un-american (“At
the federal level, 88% of forfeitures go uncontested.”).
30. See CASSELLA, supra note 23, at 9.
31. Id. at 4.
32. 16 U.S.C. § 773h.
33. 50 U.S.C. § 4315(c).
34. 50 U.S.C. § 216.
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providing for “[c]ondemnation of piratical vessels.”35 Former
Representative Henry Hyde, rarely at a loss for a colorful simile, pilloried
the broad nature of asset forfeiture by proclaiming that “the hoary
doctrines of Anglo-American civil asset forfeiture law have been
resurrected, like some jurisprudential Frankenstein monster, from the
dark recesses of the past century.”36
The Asset Forfeiture Program within the Department of Justice
officially works toward four stated goals, chief among them “[t]o punish
and deter criminal activity,” and “[t]o recover assets that may be used to
compensate victims.”37 However, the program’s effectiveness remains
the subject of considerable disagreement.38 While federal civil asset
forfeiture has stabilized to some degree over the course of the last five
years,39 its use in the preceding decades increased by orders of
magnitude.40 One 2015 analysis found that annual deposits to the
Department of Justice’s Assets Forfeiture Fund surged from $93.7 million
in 1986 to $4.5 billion in 2014—an increase of 4,667 percent.41 Civil asset
forfeiture by state governments has not escaped scrutiny either. In 2019,
the Supreme Court incorporated the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive
Fines Clause against the states and found the protection to be

35. 33 U.S.C. § 384.
36. HENRY HYDE, FORFEITING OUR PROPERTY RIGHTS 1 (1995). Hyde, a highly problematic
individual for reasons unrelated to the topic of this Note, was a vociferous critic of civil asset forfeiture
and worked for decades to limit the seizure powers of federal law enforcement agencies. He was a driving
figure behind the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, which ironically had the long-term effect of
broadening federal seizure powers. See discussion, infra Part II.D.
37. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON THE ASSET FORFEITURE
PROGRAM § 9-118.200 (2019).
38. See, e.g., Radley Balko, Study: Civil Asset Forfeiture Doesn’t Discourage Drug Use or Help
Police
Solve
Crimes,
WASH.
POST
(June
11,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/06/11/study-civil-asset-forfeiture-doesnt-discouragedrug-use-or-help-police-solve-crimes/; S. Poverty L. Ctr., supra note 29.
39. U.S. DEP;T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT DIV. 20-014, AUDIT OF THE ASSETS FORFEITURE FUND AND
SEIZED ASSET DEPOSIT FUND ANNUAL FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FISCAL YEAR 2019, available at
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2019/a20014.pdf.
40. A 2015 investigation by the Washington Post found that in the previous year, federal law
enforcement agencies “took more property from American citizens than burglars did.” Christopher
Ingraham, Law Enforcement Took More Stuff from People than Burglars did Last Year, WASH. POST
(Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/11/23/cops-took-more-stufffrom-people-than-burglars-did-last-year/.
41. DICK M. CARPENTER II, ET AL., POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET
FORFEITURE 5 (2d ed. 2015). The debate has united individuals and causes that can usually be found
opposite one another in legal battles; see Mary Hudetz, Associated Press, Forfeiture Reform Aligns
Conservative, Liberal Groups, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.businessinsider.com/apforfeiture-reform-aligns-conservative-liberal-groups-2015-10; Drug Pol’y All., New Solutions
Campaign: Civil Asset Forfeiture, https://www.drugpolicy.org/new-solutions-campaign-civil-assetforfeiture-reform (last visited Apr. 14, 2020) (groups as disparate as the American Civil Liberties Union
and the Charles Koch Institute have become allies in the push for civil forfeiture reform).
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“fundamental.”42
Decades of vigorous debate and continuously escalating stakes beg the
question, then: if in rem jurisdiction is an antiquated fiction and broad
civil asset forfeiture is overwhelmingly detested by the general public,
how did it come to pass that both are still entrenched fixtures of the
American legal system?
B. The Liberty and the Influence of British Admiralty Law
On May 9, 1768, the sloop Liberty—a ship belonging to John Hancock,
who was at the time one of the wealthiest men in Massachusetts—docked
in Boston with a shipment of Madeira wine. One month prior, Hancock
had publicly engaged with British customs officials who boarded another
of his vessels, the Lydia, when they attempted to operate beyond the
bounds of their already extensive legal mandate. 43 While the Liberty’s
arrival seemed to go much more smoothly than that of the Lydia, an
explosive conflict lurked on the horizon. On June 10, a tidewaiter who
had inspected the Liberty’s cargo upon its initial approach reported that
the crew had locked him in steerage while they furtively offloaded several
casks of wine in an attempt to avoid customs duties.44 Customs
commissioners took swift action to impound the vessel on the same day,
but were met with a “small riot” in which Bostonians smashed windows,
lit fires, and “roughed up” several of the British officials. 45 Members of
the mob then proceeded to the wharf where they lifted out of the water a
“pleasure boat” belonging to customs collector Joseph Harrison, carried
it to Boston Common, and burned it in public view.46
42. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686–87 (2019).
43. CARL UBBELOHDE, THE VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 120–
21 (1960).
44. O.M. Dickerson, John Hancock: Notorious Smuggler or Near Victim of British Revenue
Racketeers?, 32 MISS. VALLEY HIST. R. 517, 521–24 (Mar. 1946). The tidewaiter claimed to have come
forward only because the man who threatened him, Captain John Marshall (not to be confused with the
future Chief Justice of the United States), had died during the intervening month and he no longer feared
reprisals. Id.; see also THOMAS HUTCHINSON, HISTORY OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 188–
90 (John Hutchinson ed., 1828) (to avoid arousing the suspicions of customs collectors, smugglers
frequently declared and paid duties on token amounts of cargo before spiriting away the rest under cover
of darkness).
45. 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 176 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965)
[hereinafter ADAMS LEGAL PAPERS]; accord Letter from the Honorable Commissioners of His Majesty’s
Customs to Governor Francis Bernard (June 13, 1768) in 4 THE PAPERS OF FRANCIS BERNARD:
GOVERNOR OF COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTS, 1760–1769, 194 (Colin Nicolson ed., 2015) (in their letter
to Governor Bernard asking for protection, the customs commissioners noted that the conflagration was
“[i]ncreasing to such an enormous [p]itch as to give it the [a]ppearance more of an [i]nsurrection than a
[r]iot”).
46. Letter from Governor Francis Bernard to the Earl of Hillsborough, Secretary of State for the
Colonies (June 11, 1768) in 4 THE PAPERS OF FRANCIS BERNARD: GOVERNOR OF COLONIAL
MASSACHUSETTS, 1760–1769, 185–86 (Colin Nicolson ed., 2015).
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Bolstered by reinforcements from the man-of-war HMS Romney in
Boston Harbor, customs authorities eventually secured the Liberty, but
not before being forced to flee the city with their families. As tensions
simmered, Advocate General Jonathan Sewall filed an in rem action
against the ship and her cargo.47 The trial, however, was not to take place
in a regular court, and the case would never reach a jury. Rather, it would
become “one of the strangest trials ever heard in a colonial vice-admiralty
court.”48
American colonists had won a major symbolic victory when Parliament
repealed the Stamp Act49 in 1766, but its immediate replacement—the
Declaratory Act—was unequivocal in asserting that the Crown possessed
“full power and authority to make laws and statutes of sufficient force and
validity to bind the colonies and people of America . . . in all cases
whatsoever.” 50 The ensuing series of so-called Townshend Acts levied
taxes on popular commodities such as paper, glass, and tea,51 and
imparted upon British customs commissioners the legal authority to
conduct what were essentially warrantless searches.52 To the ire of
colonial merchants in particular, British courts of vice-admiralty had also
been empowered for some time to hear cases of alleged customs
violations in bench trials conducted by Crown-appointed judges.53 The
vice-admiralty courts were “objects of intense dislike among the
colonists,” in no small part because their jurisdiction “was in excess of
the powers which they possessed in the realm. . . .”54
47. ADAMS LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 45, at 177. In preparation for another voyage, crew
members had been loading barrels of oil and tar, all of which were seized. Id. (citing Joseph Harrison Esq.
v. The Sloop Liberty, 20 Barrels of Tar, 200 Barrels of Oil, Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 22 June 1768).
48. UBBELOHDE, supra note 43, at 119. Few original records survive from vice-admiralty
proceedings in the decade leading up to the American Revolution, but letters, notes, and other papers have
allowed historians to piece together the happenings of the courts remarkably well.
49. Duties in American Colonies for Defending, Protecting and Securing the Same Act of 1765, 5
Geo. 3, c. 12 (Eng.)
50. American Colonies Act of 1766, 6 Geo. 3, c. 12 (Eng.); see Instructions of Boston to its
Representatives in the General Court (June 17, 1768) in 1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 216 (Robert J.
Taylor, ed., 1977) (during a town meeting in Boston to address the seizure of the Liberty, John Adams
asserted that “the principle on which [the Stamp Act] was founded continues in full force, and a revenue
is still demanded from America”).
51. See, e.g., Indemnity Act of 1767, 7 Geo. 3, c. 56 (Eng.). Colonial assemblies also feared that
the Townshend Acts would deprive them of “the power of the purse.” JOHN C. MILLER, ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 255 (1943).
52. Townshend Revenue Act of 1766, 7 Geo. 3, c. 46 (Eng.).
53. Any remaining notion of impartiality was diminished by the fact that vice-admiralty judges
were “paid by percentages on the goods they condemned and by fixed fees. . . .” UBBELOHDE, supra note
43, at 6–7. According to Levy, “[l]ocal American juries would not likely convict a merchant, sea captain,
or vessel owner for violation of the acts of trade and navigation,” but the British recognized that “[r]esort
to vice admiralty courts evaded the need for grand jury indictment as well as conviction by a jury.” LEVY,
supra note 17, at 42–43.
54. HERBERT L. OSGOOD, 1 THE AMERICAN COLONIES IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 206 (photo.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss3/4

8

Gildenblatt: Seize the Day

2021]

SEIZE THE DAY

695

And so, the Liberty’s fate was sealed in the Court of Vice-Admiralty in
Boston when Judge Robert Auchmuty, Jr. decreed that the ship be
forfeited.55 The Liberty was sold at auction in September, where it was
purchased by none other than Joseph Harrison, the customs commissioner
whose personal boat had just been torched in the June riot. To add insult
to Hancock’s injury, Harrison fitted the sloop as a revenue cutter for the
customs authorities56—a capacity in which it would serve until July 1769,
when an angry mob in Newport, Rhode Island, seized the vessel and set
it on fire.57
C. Codification and Usage Post-1789
The affair surrounding the Liberty is but one illustration, albeit
colorful, of general public sentiment toward British admiralty and
customs laws in the decades immediately preceding the American
Revolution. In light of the fact that the newly-enfranchised American
people so despised the statutes and procedures by which the Crown seized
their property, one might reach the conclusion that the founders of the
fledgling nation would make a conscious effort to exclude such
provisions.58 Counterintuitively, however, that is not what happened. 59
During the first session of the First Congress in 1789, representatives
repr. 1958) (1924) (“[The vice-admiralty courts] came generally to be attacked on the ground that their
existence in the colonies was a violation and deprivation of the right of trial by jury, the ancient guaranty
of the liberties of Englishmen wherever they lived.”). But see Matthew P. Harrington, Rethinking In Rem:
The Supreme Court’s New (and Misguided) Approach to Civil Forfeiture, 12 YALE L. & POL. R. 281, 292
(1994) (Colonial merchants and seamen readily resorted to in rem seizures of vessels when prosecuting
claims for wages, breach of contract, salvage, or damage to cargo.”).
55. Hancock was tried in personam in October 1768 for charges related to illegal offloading of
Madeira and incitement of a riot, but he prevailed in large part due to the savvy procedural maneuvering
of his attorney, John Adams. ADAMS LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 45, at 177–79; UBBELOHDE, supra note
43, at 125–27.
56. Revenue cutters are government vessels “employed especially to enforce revenue laws.” See
Revenue Cutter, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993). Until the re-establishment
of the U.S. Navy in 1798, the Revenue-Marine, precursor to the modern U.S. Coast Guard, served as the
only armed federal maritime force. NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECS. ADMIN., RR#517, REVENUE CUTTER
SERVICE EMPLOYEES, 1790-1915 (2013).
57. ADAMS LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 45, at 178–80. In a strange twist, the mob initially
extinguished the fire after learning that “a considerable [q]uantity of [p]owder was on board,” at which
point they scuttled the ship and then proceeded to light two additional vessels on fire. BOS. GAZETTE &
COUNTRY J., July 24, 1769, at 2.
58. In the midst of the Liberty affair, John Adams reminded his fellow Bostonians that “it is our
unalterable resolution, at all times, to assert and vindicate our dear and invaluable rights and liberties, at
the utmost hazard of our lives and fortunes; and we have a full a rational confidence that no designs formed
against them will ever prosper.” Instructions of the Town of Boston to their Representatives (June 17,
1768) in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 502 (Charles
Francis Adams ed., 1865).
59. See LEVY, supra note 17, at 50–51 (“Parliament’s 1696 act of trade and navigation . . . once
regarded as an instrument of oppression, animated American civil forfeiture law.”).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021

9

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 4

696

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 89

established a detailed customs framework that included in rem civil
forfeiture.60 One is hard-pressed to believe that a majority of Congress
had a change of heart or that the passage of forfeiture statutes constituted
a colossal oversight on the part of everyone involved. Rather, the cashstrapped young government recognized the need for steady sources of
revenue and identified in rem forfeiture as one possible solution. In an
apparent attempt to differentiate the new statutes from the much-reviled
British admiralty statutes on which they were based, Congress established
notice requirements and procedures for claimants to dispute a seizure of
their property.61 While some protections were subsequently diminished
by statute, the system was nevertheless distinguishable from its British
progenitor. And as the Court heard civil forfeiture cases, it began to
establish lasting precedent,62 a not insignificant amount of which still
stands today. Indeed, as the Supreme Court noted nearly two centuries
after the first American civil forfeiture measures were codified, “[t]he
enactment of forfeiture statutes has not abated; contemporary federal and
state forfeiture statutes reach virtually any type of property that might be
used in the conduct of a criminal enterprise.”63
Apart from the Confiscation Act of 1862, allowing the Union to initiate
“in rem civil proceedings to inflict punishment on rebels who possessed
property in the North,”64 the government rarely utilized civil forfeiture
outside of cases at admiralty until the Court expanded its application to
allow for the seizure of property used in violation of tax laws (particularly
alcohol tax laws).65 Though somewhat distinct from traditional admiralty
issues, this expansion can be explained partly by the fact that prior to the
Sixteenth Amendment, the federal government was dependent on other
taxes—specifically those on “liquor, customs, and tobacco”—for

60. See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 12, 1 Stat. 29, 39 (establishing forfeiture as a penalty for
specified customs violations).
61. See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 36, 1 Stat. 29, 47. Although seizure itself often serves as de
facto notice to a property owner, not all property owners are present or aware of the circumstances. Id.
Thus, the government was required to publish notices widely in the press. Harrington, supra note 54, at
289.
62. See, e.g., United States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796) (establishing that
forfeiture of vessels be tried in admiralty); United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398
(1814) (establishing that the government holds claim to the title of property immediately upon seizure);
The Brig Ann, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 289 (1815) (establishing the requirement that the government must
have actual or constructive possession of property in order to initiate forfeiture proceedings); The Palmyra,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827) (establishing that the government may seize property, regardless of whether
the owner has been criminally convicted); United States v. The Cargo of the Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S.
(2 How.) 210 (1844) (establishing liability for innocent owners of ships seized for piratical acts).
63. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974).
64. LEVY, supra note 17, at 51.
65. CASSELLA, supra note 23, at 31–32 (citing Dobbins Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395
(1878); J.W. Goldsmith Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921)).
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operating revenue.66 A piecemeal expansion continued through the early
and mid-twentieth century until Congress implemented a wholesale
overhaul by permitting law enforcement agencies to seize not only the
instrumentalities of a crime, but “the proceeds of the offense,” and
“property used to facilitate it.”67
D. The Re-Emergence of Civil Asset Forfeiture and Subsequent Reform
Efforts
As the crime rate rose and drug trafficking reached record highs in the
United States throughout the 1970s and 1980s,68 Congress sought to take
advantage of civil forfeiture in a way that it had never done before. In a
1981 report to then-Senator Joseph R. Biden, the Comptroller General of
the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) claimed that despite passage of
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (“OCCA,” also known as the
“Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,” or “RICO”),
“[t]he Government has simply not exercised the kind of leadership and
management necessary to make asset forfeiture a widely used law
enforcement technique.”69 Congress followed some of the GAO report’s
recommendations by passing the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984 (“CCCA”) and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994 (“VCCLEA”), expanding civil forfeiture into a blunt law
enforcement tool capable of being wielded in a sweeping manner.70
With this vast expansion, however, came concern from across the
political spectrum that civil forfeiture was enabling law enforcement
agencies to violate fundamental rights with near-impunity. As the Court
sanctioned the expansion in large part and established that claimants were
no longer entitled under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
to receive pre-seizure notice in civil forfeiture cases,71 successive
Congresses debated how to reestablish safeguards akin to those passed by
the First Congress.
These efforts culminated in the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of

66. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 60 (1993) (“In 1902, for example,
nearly 75 percent of total federal revenues . . . was raised from taxes on liquor, customs, and tobacco.”).
67. CASSELLA, supra note 23, at 33.
68. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics,
https://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/State/RunCrimeStatebyState.cfm.
69. U.S. GAO COMPTROLLER GENERAL, GGD-81-51, ASSET FORFEITURE—A SELDOM USED
TOOL IN COMBATTING DRUG TRAFFICKING ii (1981) (referencing both criminal and civil forfeiture).
70. Shawn Kantor, Carl Kitchens, & Steven Pawlowski, Civil Asset Forfeiture, Crime, and Police
Incentives: Evidence from the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 23873, 2017), available at http://www/nber.org/papers/w23873;
EDGEWORTH, supra note 21, at 24.
71. EDGEWORTH, supra note 21, at 55.
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2000 (“CAFRA”)—a bipartisan undertaking that created a clear
“innocent owner” defense, allowed successful claimants to recover
interest and attorney fees, and established a four-part test which, when
satisfied, waives the federal government’s protections under sovereign
immunity.72 However, contrary to its drafters’ recognition that civil
forfeiture “is a useful law enforcement tool, but one that needs to be
carefully monitored,”73 CAFRA, in its attempt to hold the government
accountable, actually further expanded the federal government’s seizure
powers in some areas.74 Subsequent reform efforts, despite gaining
across-the-board support,75 have fallen flat and largely failed to curtail
what has become an increasingly significant enforcement tool.
E. The Circuit Split Over In Rem Counterclaims
1. United States v. One Lot of U.S. Currency ($68,000), etc.
On November 23, 1988, Giovanni Castiello drove his Lincoln Town
Car to Boston’s Logan Airport for a meeting with his new cocaine
supplier, “Joe.”76 One week prior, Castiello had driven with Joe to a
restaurant and agreed to purchase four kilograms of cocaine in exchange
for $68,000 in cash. However, when the two met to complete their
transaction and Castiello presented a shoe box of $68,000 in mixed bills,
he subsequently learned that Joe was in fact Agent Joseph W. Desmond
of the Drug Enforcement Agency. 77 Castiello was indicted, tried, and
convicted of attempting to possess, with intent to distribute, a Schedule II
controlled substance, for which the district court sentenced him to ninetyseven months in prison.78
After exhausting his criminal appeals, Castiello then focused his
attention on appealing the civil forfeiture of his cash and car, in addition
72. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 983.
73. Federal Asset Forfeiture: Uses and Reforms: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 5 (2015)
(statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
74. See EDGEWORTH, supra note 21, at 27; see also Federal Asset Forfeiture: Uses and Reforms:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 3 (2015) (statement of Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Chairman, H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations) (“It
was a noble effort, but it plainly fell short. . . . Forfeiture’s only defenders seem to be its beneficiaries, the
law enforcement agencies entitled to keep the proceeds of their seizures.”). By leaving the equitable
sharing framework effectively untouched, CAFRA also did little to disincentivize forfeiture as a source
of revenue for the government.
75. See Drug Pol’y All., supra note 41.
76. $68,000, 927 F.2d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1991).
77. Id. at 31–32.
78. Castiello v. United States, 915 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1990).
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to the “portable telephone” and “various other items of personal property”
that had been inside the Town Car on the day of his arrest. 79 And while
the First Circuit Court of Appeals in March 1991 focused largely upon
whether Castiello’s counsel was afforded ample time to prepare for the
case and whether Castiello had even met his burden of proof “that the
property was not used in violation of the statute,”80 the court also rebuffed
Castiello’s “self-styled counterclaim” against the government for
possession of the property that had been inside of his car.81
The court first directed its attention to the plain meaning of
“counterclaim,” and noted that “[b]y definition, a counterclaim is a turnthe-tables response directed by one party (‘A’) at another party (‘B’) in
circumstances where ‘B’ has earlier lodged a claim in the same
proceeding against ‘A.’”82 Thus, because civil forfeiture actions are in
rem and the government did not file an accompanying in personam civil
action against Castiello, “there was no ‘claim’ to ‘counter,’” and
“Castiello’s self-styled counterclaim was a nullity.”83
Next, the court pointed out that the warrant and subsequent order of
forfeiture against the Town Car “did not expressly extend to personal
property within the vehicle,” and was therefore not even at issue (despite
the fact that the car remained in government custody).84 As a result, the
court felt that Castiello ought to have sought the return of his property by
administrative means, by bringing a motion in his underlying criminal

79. See $68,000, 927 F.2d at 31 (the district court granted the government’s motion for summary
judgment) (21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) empowers the government to seize “[a]ll conveyances . . . which are
used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt,
possession, or concealment of [controlled substances],” while 21 U.S.C. §881(a)(6) calls for the forfeiture
of “[a]ll moneys . . . furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled
substance . . . .”).
80. Id.at 32 (quoting United States v. Parcel of Land & Residence at 28 Emery St., Merrimac,
Mass., 914 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990)).
81. Id. at 34–35.
82. Id. at 34.
83. Id. To reiterate its point, the court noted that “instead of being dragooned into the case as a
defendant, [Castiello] intervened as a claimant,” and was therefore not entitled to file a counterclaim. Id.
84. Id. at 34–35 (citing United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz, Four-Door Sedan, VIN: 116–
036–12–004084, 711 F.2d 1297, 1304–05 (5th Cir. 1983)). Similar to $68,000, the car at issue in 1978
Mercedes Benz was seized under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) after its owners were suspected of transporting
cocaine. The district court found that while the government possessed probable cause to seize the car
itself, it did not hold title over the property inside. The Fifth Circuit agreed and held that although the car
phone was bolted down and attached to the vehicle’s main electrical system, the statute did not permit for
the forfeiture of a vehicle’s “tools and appurtenances,” and there existed no legislative record from the
passage of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 to indicate that Congress
intended appurtenances to be included in the forfeiture of a vehicle by default. For the uninitiated, car
phones were the only commercially-available mobile telephones in the United States until Motorola
introduced the DynaTAC to consumer markets in 1983. Because analog cellular service was not offered
to consumers until 1984, earlier car phones operated on a VHF system and required both a power source
and fairly unwieldy radio antenna.
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case, or by filing a separate civil action.85 While it was far from critical to
the larger holding, the court’s decision to discuss and subsequently reject
the availability of counterclaims as a remedy in in rem actions left an
impression, as it came to be relied upon by district courts in the Second,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.86
After the First Circuit’s decision in $68,000, no sister circuit explicitly
embraced or rejected its anti-counterclaim position until the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals heard the case of the Zappone family. 87 On November
8, 2012, agents of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) executed a search
warrant against the Ohio Scrap Corporation in Delta, Ohio.88 The raid was
the result of an IRS investigation into the business and its owners—Carrie
and Todd Zappone—for illegal structuring under 31 U.S.C. §
5324(a)(3).89 During the course of the search, federal agents seized a large
amount of currency from a safe, and the IRS initiated a forfeiture action
in April 2013 against $1,264,000.00 in cash. 90 The Zappones filed an
administrative claim for the cash, and then followed up with an amended
claim asserting that the IRS had, in actuality, seized “at least”
$3,150,000.00.91 In February 2015, the IRS denied the Zappones’
administrative claims from the previous year, and the Zappones
responded by bringing a new action against the government under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) 92 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named

85. Id.at 35; see also United States v. Wilson, 540 F.2d 1100, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“[I]t is
fundamental to the integrity of the criminal justice process that property involved in the proceeding,
against which no Government claim lies, be returned promptly to its rightful owner,” thus a claimant is
entitled to bring civil action for return of such property.).
86. See United States v. Assorted Computer Equip., No. 03-2356V, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6334
(W.D. Tenn. Jan, 9, 2004); United States v. All Funds Located in Banca Popolare Friuladria Account
Number 70451 in the Name of Senol Taskin, No. 5:13-cv-1090 (GLS/TWD), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26572 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2014); United States v. 8 Luxury Vehicles, 88 F. Supp 3d 1332 (M.D. Fla 2015);
United States v. Various Rest. Furniture & Goods of Iranian Origin, No. CV 15-259-GW(MRWx), 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186604 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2016); United States v. Certain Real Prop. Commonly Known
as 4512 South Drexel Blvd. Chicago, Illinois, 381 F. Supp. 3d 1007 (E.D. Wis. 2018); United States v.
$4,480,466.16 in Funds Seized from Bank of America Account Ending in 2653, No. 3:17-CV-2989-D,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70180 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2018); United States v. Approximately $10,128,847.42
Seized from US Bank Account No. -5234, No. 1:18-CV-0279-SWS-MLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207350
(D.N.M. Dec. 3, 2018).
87. Zappone v. United States, 870 F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 2017) [hereinafter Zappone].
88. Elizabeth Reed, IRS Agents Raid Delta Scrap Yard, NBC 24 NEWS (Nov. 8, 2012),
https://nbc24.com/news/local/irs-agents-raid-delta-scrap-yard?id=823015.
89. Illegal structuring is the act of conducting banking transactions in such a way as to “avoid the
creation of certain records and reports required by the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and/or IRC 6050I.” I.R.M.
§ 4.26.13.1(1) (2020).
90. Ohio Scrap Corp. v. United States (Dep’t of the Treasury, IRS), No. 3:14 CV 535, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 142156, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 27, 2014); United States v. $1,264,000.00 in U.S. Currency,
No. 3:13-cv-905, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49566 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2018).
91. See Ohio Scrap Corp., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142156, at *2.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq.
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Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.93
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
government and named federal employees, 94 and the Zappones filed an
appeal with the Sixth Circuit asserting, in part, that the district court erred
by choosing not to equitably toll their otherwise time-barred FTCA
claim.95 In affirming the district court’s holding, the Sixth Circuit noted
that a civil forfeiture action “is a suit in rem against the res,” and is
therefore “brought against property, not people.”96 Then, by way of
affirming the district court’s ruling that the Zappones could not have
pursued a Bivens claim in a civil forfeiture proceeding to begin with, the
court cited $68,000 to reiterate that “while the purported owner of the
property may intervene in the action, he may not assert counterclaims
against the United States.”97
Although the issue of in rem counterclaims was nearly infinitesimal in
the scheme of the Zappone cases, district courts in the Seventh and Tenth
Circuits nevertheless relied upon the Sixth Circuit’s dicta to bar such
claims in accordance with the First Circuit’s original interpretation. 98 The
First Circuit, meanwhile, has continued to utilize variants of the $68,000
standard in such high profile cases as United States v. One-Sixth Share of
James J. Bulger in All Present & Future Proceeds of Mass Millions
Lottery Ticket No. M246233, Registered in the Name of Michael Linskey,
a dispute over lottery winnings initially forfeited by notorious mob boss
Whitey Bulger.99

93. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Court in Bivens held that individuals whose constitutional rights are
violated by federal agents have an implied right of action against said agents. However, the doctrine has
been significantly restricted and sparingly applied in the years since.
94. Zappone v. United States, No. 3:15 CV 2135, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113083, at *12–*13
(N.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 2016).
95. Zappone, 870 F.3d 551, 561 (6th Cir. 2017).
96. Id. (quoting United States v. All Funds in Account Nos. 747.034/278, 747.009/278, &
747.714/278 Banco Espanol de Credito, Spain, 295 F.3d 23, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
97. Id. (citing $68,000, 927 F.2d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 1991)).
98. See United States v. Certain Real Prop. Commonly Known as 4512 South Drexel Blvd. Chi.,
Ill., 381 F. Supp. 3d 1007 (E.D. Wis. 2018); United States v. Approximately $10,128,847.42 Seized from
US Bank Account No. -5234, No. 1:18-CV-0279-SWS-MLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207350 (D.N.M.
Dec. 3, 2018).
99. 326 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Because civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding, the property
subject to forfeiture is the defendant. Thus, defenses against the forfeiture can be brought only by third
parties, who must intervene.”). Bulger was a long-time Boston mob boss and criminal informant who
disappeared in 1994, shortly before federal agents planned to unseal an indictment against him for
racketeering. Upon his capture in 2011, Bulger was tried and convicted of numerous crimes, including
eleven murders, and sentenced to two life terms. In 2018, he was murdered in prison. See Robert D.
McFadden, Whitey Bulger is Dead in Prison at 89; Long-Hunted Boston Mob Boss, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/30/obituaries/whitey-bulger-dead.html.
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2. United States v. $4,480,466.16 in Funds Seized from Bank of
America Account Ending in 2653
Throughout September and October 2017, law enforcement officials
from United States Department of Veterans Affairs—as part of an
ongoing effort in the decades-long fight against benefits fraud100—
obtained multiple seizure warrants for property and bank accounts
belonging to Jon and Tess Davis, the owners of Retail Ready Career
Center (“RRCC”) in Garland, Texas.101 RRCC was a for-profit vocational
training center that hosted six-week HVAC certification programs, and
the VA Inspector General had suspected for months that the company was
in violation of the so-called “85-15 Rule.”102 As a result of an “aggressive
sales pitch,” ninety percent of RRCC students were veterans, and in 2016
alone the company received $28,858,494 in VA education benefits.103
After federal agents executed the first seizure warrants against RRCC on
September 20, the Texas Veterans Commission—the state agency
responsible for accrediting educational and vocational programs that
receive VA education benefits—revoked RRCC’s approval.104 Shortly
thereafter, RRCC closed its doors.105
The seizures from RRCC included the contents of a Bank of America
account containing $4,480,466.16 (the named defendant); hundreds-ofthousands of dollars more spread across six accounts at Bank of America,
Capital One, Charles Schwab, Wells Fargo, and the Bank of Utah; a 2014
Lamborghini Aventador; a 2016 Ferrari 488; a 2017 Bentley Continental
GT V8; a 2017 Mercedes-Benz AMG S63; a 2016 Mercedes-Benz G63;
a 2016 Dodge Ram 2500; a 2016 BMW Alpina; real property at 14888
100. See, e.g., David Whitman, Report—The Cycle of Scandal at For-Profit Colleges, Truman,
Eisenhower, and the First GI Bill Scandal, THE CENTURY FOUND. (Jan. 24, 2017),
https://tcf.org/content/report/truman-eisenhower-first-gi-bill-scandal/.
101. See Government’s Response to Motion for Immediate Release of Seized Property at PageID
417-20, United States v. $4,480,466.16 in Funds Seized From Bank of Am. Account Ending in 2653, No.
3:17-CV-2989-D, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70180 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 26, 2017).
102. 38 C.F.R. § 21.4201(a). Initially codified in 1952, the 85-15 Rule holds that the VA may not
disburse additional educational benefits to students in an approved program if more than eighty-five
percent of the students already in the program are veterans receiving federal student aid.
103. Eva-Marie Ayala, Hundreds of Veterans Scramble After Garland For-Profit College Closes,
DALL.
MORNING
NEWS
(Sept.
28,
2017),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/education/2017/09/28/hundreds-of-veterans-scramble-after-garlandfor-profit-college-closes/.
104. Statement on Retail Ready Career Center Closure, TEX. VETERANS COMM’N (Sept. 20, 2017),
https://www.tvc.texas.gov/statement-on-retail-ready-career-center-closure/.
105. Noelle Walker, Garland Vocational School Abruptly Closes Leaving Students and Staff
Wondering Why, NBC 5 DFW (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/garland-vocationalschool-abruptly-closes-leaving-students-and-staff-wondering-why/40653/; Kevin Cokely, Investigators
Seize Millions in Assets from Vocational School Owner, NBC 5 DFW (Nov. 2, 2017),
https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/investigators-seize-millions-in-assets-from-vocational-schoolowner/45151/.
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Lake Forest Drive in Dallas, Texas; and real property at 195 North 200
West and 1408 West 2125 South in Logan, Utah—all belonging to Jon
and Tess Davis personally or through incorporated entities.106 Prosecutors
alleged that in total, Jon and Tess Davis, through RRCC, received “more
than $67 million from the VA,” to which they were not entitled. 107
Citing an ongoing criminal investigation, the government asked the
district court to stay the forfeiture proceedings108 and also requested that
the court dismiss RRCC’s counterclaims. 109 The district court denied the
government’s motion to stay the proceedings but granted it leave to file a
second amended complaint, setting in motion a timeline of separate legal
proceedings that have yet to be concluded at the time of publication for
this Note.110
RRCC’s two constitutional counterclaims alleged an unreasonable
seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment and a violation of Fifth
Amendment due process rights. Its argument centered largely around the
ideas that “as a matter of historical practice, an owner of arrested property
can bring suit against the government in actions in rem,” and that
counterclaims are permissible under the Supplemental Rules for
Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions.111 Further,
RRCC asserted that because the Fifth Circuit had never explicitly held in
rem counterclaims to be impermissible and the First Circuit did not cite
authority for its position on counterclaims in $68,000, the government
could point to no solid basis for its motion. Unpersuaded, the district court
held that “absent binding Fifth Circuit authority to the contrary . . . as a
claimant in an in rem civil forfeiture action, RRCC cannot bring a
counterclaim.”112
After the district court entered a final judgment to dismiss RRCC’s
counterclaims, RRCC appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Without addressing
the categorical bar on in rem counterclaims, however, the court promptly
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claims due to “a more
fundamental reason”: the government had not waived sovereign
106. United States’ Third Amended Verified Complaint for Forfeiture at PageID 1299-1303, United
States v. $4,480,466.16 in Funds Seized From Bank of Am. Account Ending in 2653, No. 3:17-CV-2989D, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70180 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2018); the basis for forfeiture included wire fraud,
mail fraud, theft of government funds, and conspiracy to commit any specified unlawful activity.
107. Id. at PageID 1304.
108. A court may stay forfeiture proceedings if it “determines that civil discovery will adversely
affect the ability of the Government to conduct a related criminal investigation or the prosecution of a
related criminal case.” 18 U.S.C. § 981(g)(1).
109. United States v. $4,480,466.16 in Funds Seized from Bank of Am. Account Ending in 2653,
No. 3:17-CV-2989-D, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70180, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2018).
110. Id. at *22.
111. Id. at *19.
112. Id. at *21–22 (the court took advantage of the opportunity to point out that RRCC also did not
cite binding authority for its counterclaim argument).
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immunity, and the district court, therefore, lacked subject matter
jurisdiction from the beginning.113 Although RRCC contended that the
government’s sovereign immunity had been waived under CAFRA’s
2000 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)(1)–(4), the court held that such
a waiver does not extend to constitutional torts. 114 RRCC also attempted
to argue that “simply by ‘initiat[ing] an in rem proceeding,’” the
government waived sovereign immunity.115 The court labeled RRCC’s
argument “grandiose” and noted that such a precedent was only
applicable “to admiralty cases allowing a limited cross-libel against the
United States when the United States sues another vessel for collision
damages.”116
In response to the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, RRCC filed a petition for a
panel rehearing which the court denied in November 2019. The opinion
denying RRCC’s request, however, contained something far less common
than the cursory denial of a petition for panel rehearing: the court
withdrew the opinion it had published only three months prior and
substituted it with an opinion addressing in rem counterclaims—the very
issue it had initially declined to review.117 For reasons that remain unclear,
the same Fifth Circuit panel maintained its original position that RRCC’s
counterclaims were barred by sovereign immunity, but “declin[ed] to
endorse” the position that in rem counterclaims against the government
are categorically impermissible, thereby creating a circuit split:
[T]he fact that a forfeiture proceeding is “in rem, not in personam” does
not determine a claimant's rights in the proceeding. The forfeiture rules
allow a claimant to take numerous actions respecting the seized property,
even though the proceeding is “in rem.” To begin with, a claimant may
“file a claim” to protect his interests in the property. He may also file: (1)
an answer to the government's complaint, Supp. Rule G(5)(b); (2) a Rule
12 motion, id.; (3) objections to government interrogatories, Supp.
Rule G(6)(b); (4) a motion to suppress use of the seized property as
evidence, Supp. Rule G(8)(a); and (5) a motion raising a defense under
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, Supp. Rule G(8)(e).
. . . And the civil forfeiture statute lets claimants do other things, such as:
(1) raise and prove an “innocent owner” defense, 18 U.S.C. § 983(d); (2)
move to set aside the forfeiture for lack of notice, id. § 983(e); and (3) seek
immediate release of seized property, id. § 983(f). The point being: If a
claimant can do all this in in rem forfeiture proceedings, it cannot be that
he is barred from filing counterclaims simply because forfeitures are “in
113. United States v. $4,480,466.16 in Funds Seized from Bank of Am. Account Ending in 2653,
936 F.3d 233, 234 (5th Cir. 2019).
114. Id. at 237–38 (citing Spotts v. United States, 613 F.3d 559, 565 n.3 (5th Cir. 2010)).
115. Id. at 238.
116. Id. at 238–39.
117. $4,480,466.16, 942 F.3d 655, 656 (5th Cir. 2019).
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rem and not in personam.”118

While the court did make note of the practically identical nature of Rule
13 intervenors to claimants in a civil forfeiture proceeding (“[i]n $68,000
itself, the First Circuit said Castiello ‘intervened as a claimant”), it staked
its argument primarily on the panoply of rights available to claimants, as
well as longstanding practice in admiralty cases to allow cross-libels. 119
The latter seemed especially persuasive to the court, because civil asset
forfeiture is largely rooted in Anglo-American admiralty law and
procedure in such cases is governed to this day by the same set of
supplemental rules to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.120 Ultimately,
the court held that claimants should not be universally barred from filing
counterclaims against the government in a forfeiture proceeding simply
because the property, and not the claimant, is the defendant.121
III. DISCUSSION
When the Fifth Circuit “respectfully reject[ed] the First Circuit’s broad
rationale for barring counterclaims in in rem civil forfeiture proceedings,”
it cast doubt over a precedent that had been relied upon by federal courts
across the nation for nearly three decades.122 The fact that a vast majority
of civil forfeitures are uncontested,123 coupled with the availability of
additional remedies,124 means that the question of in rem counterclaims
rarely arises. However, the circuit split created by $4,480,466.16 has both
procedural and substantive implications, and federal courts are now left
to resolve irreconcilable holdings with little to no input from the Supreme
Court or other circuits.
Part A of this Section explores the theory on which the First Circuit
rested its unconditional bar on in rem counterclaims against the
government, and illustrates why that theory is insufficient to address the
matter at hand. Part B surveys the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning and concludes
that the court employed a more comprehensive and effective means of
analysis than the First Circuit. Finally, Part C argues that the modern
application of in rem civil forfeiture has proliferated far beyond its
intended uses, and thus, no longer serves the interests of justice.
118. Id. at 659–60.
119. Id. at 661. A cross-libel in admiralty is the functional equivalent of a counterclaim. See Cross
Libel, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010).
120. $4,480,466.16, 942 F.3d at 661–63 (considering contextual clues in the Supplemental Rules
for Admiralty or Maritime and Asset Forfeiture Actions, “it would seem anomalous to say that
counterclaims are always out-of-bounds in in rem proceedings”).
121. Id. at 663.
122. Id. at 660.
123. See S. Poverty L. Ctr., supra note 29.
124. See generally $4,480,466.16, 942 F.3d at 659–60.
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A. The First Circuit’s reliance solely on plain meaning interpretation
failed to account for significant historical factors, thereby diminishing
the reliability of its opinion.
The First Circuit in $68,000 deemed Castiello’s attempted
counterclaim “a nullity,” and relied solely on a plain meaning
interpretation to find an unconditional bar on in rem counterclaims against
the government.125 Likewise, $68,000’s progeny have also failed to
unearth binding precedent or provide substantial additional support for a
blanket prohibition on counterclaims.126 While a strict plain meaning
interpretation may seem the most intuitive—after all, an inanimate object
clearly lacks the agency necessary to initiate a counterclaim—it critically
fails to take into account how the doctrine in question was shaped.
In the context of modern in rem civil forfeiture, it is insufficient to
frame a counterclaim merely as “a turn-the-tables response directed by
one party (‘A’) at another party (‘B’) in circumstances where ‘B’ has
earlier lodged a claim in the same proceeding against ‘A.’”127 Apart from
customs and tax violations, in rem forfeiture was useful in the early days
of the Republic for seizing property when an owner was unknown or
outside the reach of the court. Now, however, the government rarely finds
occasion to seize active pirate ships and is more than capable of
ascertaining the identity and whereabouts of a given property owner.
Moreover, the First Circuit’s remarks in $68,000 on in rem counterclaims
took up just two paragraphs and could easily be construed as dicta. 128
Despite its shortcomings, however, the $68,000 rule was widely applied
by courts across the country when addressing this issue.
An in rem claimant likely holds title to the property in question; to
impose an unconditional bar on in rem counterclaims against the
government risks elevating form over substance, and tramples on the
rights of owners and claimants in the process. There is some scholarly
support for the argument that by bringing an in rem civil forfeiture action,
the government consents to potential counterclaims from owners because
jurisdiction for the counterclaim itself is not in rem.129 But even without

125. See $68,000, 927 F.2d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 1991). Notably, the court also did not cite any judicial
authorities to support its position.
126. See discussion, supra Part II.E.1.
127. $68,000, 927 F.2d at 34.
128. See $4,480,466.16, 942 F.3d at 660; $68,000, 927 F.2d at 34.
129. See, e.g., Paul S. Grossman, Appellate Jurisdiction for Civil Forfeiture: The Case for the
Continuation of Jurisdiction Beyond the Release of the Res, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 679, 695 (1991)
(“Jurisdiction for the counterclaim is not in rem because in rem jurisdiction is asserted against property,
not an individual. Therefore, the inference must be that when a plaintiff brings an in rem action, the
plaintiff consents to in personam jurisdiction for counterclaims.”). As was the case in $4,480,466.16, the
government may still be able to validly invoke sovereign immunity, but the waivable nature of sovereign
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a general rule of consent, a pure plain meaning interpretation with no
precedential support is unable to stand on its own.
B. The Fifth Circuit’s normative interpretation is a more accurate
reflection of both historical precedent and the current legal realities.
In addressing the question of whether counterclaims against the
government are permissible in in rem civil forfeiture cases, the Fifth
Circuit took a more comprehensive approach that considered existing
legal precedent and historical context, in addition to plain meaning. While
the First Circuit’s interpretation was certainly neither unreasonable nor
illogical, the Fifth Circuit took exception to it on three main grounds: (1)
the procedural rules governing forfeiture actions provide a claimant with
a plethora of options, and this fact “sits uneasily with the notion that a
claimant can never bring counterclaims in those proceedings”; (2) the
strong similarities between intervenors and claimants would seem to
contravene “a blanket rule barring claimants’ counterclaims in forfeiture
proceedings”; and (3) admiralty law has “long entertained counterclaims
(or their equivalents) in in rem proceedings.”130
The first prong of the Fifth Circuit’s analysis rested on the notion that
“the answer to this puzzle does not lie in the brute fact that, in a forfeiture
proceeding, ‘[t]he property is the defendant.’”131 Rather, the court
outlined five uncontested mechanisms by which claimants can assert their
interests in a civil forfeiture proceeding, and alluded to the possibility that
a claimant’s best option to preserve a property interest may well lie in a
counterclaim.132 Perhaps more substantively, the court identified striking
similarities between a claimant who intervenes and one who attempts to
file a counterclaim. Examining the fact that “[u]nder federal law, an
intervenor of right is treated as he were an original party and has equal
standing with the original parties,” 133 the court found nothing in “the
kinship between ‘claimants’ and ‘intervenors’” to support an
unconditional bar on counterclaims.134
Most compelling from a procedural perspective, however, is the final
prong of the court’s analysis: “adopting the First Circuit's reasoning
in $68,000 would conflict with practice in admiralty cases,” to which civil

immunity also means that it alone cannot be seen to impose a uniform bar on counterclaims against the
government.
130. $4,480,466.16, 942 F.3d at 660–61.
131. Id. at 660 (quoting $68,000, 927 F.2d at 34).
132. Id.
133. Id. (quoting Brown v. Demco, 792 F.2d 478, 480–81 (5th Cir. 1986)) (internal quotations
omitted).
134. Id. at 660–61.
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asset forfeiture is still strongly linked.135 Although the court looked only
to in rem actions filed by private parties against the property of other
private parties (providing a differentiating factor to actions that the
government has initiated), it nevertheless clearly rebutted the First
Circuit’s blanket prohibition. The Fifth Circuit also cited a case in which
the government itself “intervened in [a] plaintiffs’ in rem action as a party
defendant and filed a counterclaim asserting a property right [to a disputed
seventeenth-century shipwreck off the Florida coast].”136
The 2000 Advisory Committee Note for the Supplemental Rules for
Admiralty or Maritime and Asset Forfeiture Action, while not explicitly
addressing the permissibility of in rem counterclaims, also clarifies that
plaintiffs are required to put up security against any counterclaim in an in
rem action “when the counterclaim is asserted by a person who has given
security to respond in damages in the original action.” 137 If in rem
counterclaims were not permissible, one would be hard-pressed to find a
reason for the Advisory Committee’s clarification, or indeed, the very
presence of a requirement to put up security against a counterclaim in the
first place.138
Until now, courts have accepted the government’s formalistic analysis
that claimants are not only not defendants, but also not full parties to in
rem civil forfeiture actions. Putting aside for a moment that such an
analysis does not comport with the history discussed above, it potentially
leaves owners and claimants without a course of action that suitably
guarantees their rights.139 Therefore, it seems clear that the Fifth Circuit’s
reasoning in $4,480,466.16 was correct and should be adopted by lower
courts and sister circuits, unless or until the Supreme Court takes up the
matter or Congress significantly amends the relevant statutes.
C. Modern legal realities necessitate a renewed examination of the
procedure governing in rem claims.
Three interconnected explanations illustrate why in rem counterclaims

135. Id. at 661; accord supra note 122.
136. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, Her Tackle,
Armament, Apparel and Cargo Located Within 2500 Yards of a Point at Coordinates 24.31.5’ North
Latitude and 82.50 West Longitude, 569 F.2d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 1978).
137. FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. R. E(7)(a) advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
138. To be clear, counterclaims may still be barred for other reasons.
139. See, e.g., Oversight of Federal Asset Forfeiture: Its Role in Fighting Crime: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 5 (1999)
(statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy) (“We put the onus on the citizen to perfectly navigate the bureaucratic
labyrinth in order to liberate what is presumptively his or hers in the first place. And if the citizen proves
inept in proving his innocence, in effect, the government may keep the property without ever having to
justify or explain its actions.”).
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against the government continue to command so little attention: (1) until
the latter part of the twentieth century, in rem civil forfeiture remained a
mechanism that was fairly limited in scope and application; 140 (2) since
in rem civil forfeitures are overwhelmingly uncontested,141 there is little
opportunity for disputes to rise through the court system; and (3) because
the First Circuit’s $68,000 precedent stood alone for decades and in rem
civil forfeiture procedures allow a claimant to take any number of actions
aside from a counterclaim (as the Fifth Circuit explained in
$4,480,466.16), claimants may have consistently deemed it more prudent
to undertake an alternative legal strategy.
If, however, “proceedings in rem are simply structures that allow the
Government to quiet title to criminally-tainted property in a single
proceeding,”142 it then seems reasonable to assume that in rem civil
forfeiture cannot stand as it currently is while also respecting procedural
rights. The government possesses a great deal of power when it initiates
in rem civil forfeiture actions, and the $68,000 rule does not provide
suitable remedies for owners or claimants.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although an admittedly miniscule component of the larger public
debate over asset forfeiture, the question of whether counterclaims against
the government are permissible in federal in rem civil forfeiture actions
is more than an exercise in semantics. The lines between in rem and in
personam jurisdiction have been sufficiently blurred to the point that
Congress must seriously consider a comprehensive restructuring of civil
forfeiture law that establishes clear safeguards based on modern realities.
The present circuit split is but one result of a failed system that has
proliferated far beyond its mandate and no longer adequately serves the
purposes it was intended to serve.

140. See, e.g., discussion supra Part II.C.
141. See supra note 29; see also Michael van den Berg, Proposing a Transactional Approach to
Civil Asset Forfeiture, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 867, 893 (2015) (“[M]ost [mid- to low-value chattel] are not
economically valuable enough to merit a defense, absent a blanket right to counsel.”).
142. CASSELLA, supra note 23, at 34.
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